The Seven Deadly Mistakes in Industrial Megaprojects

Meet Alaska 2012

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IPAL independent project analysis, inc



Our Vantage Point on the Industry


- Independent Project Analysis evaluates industrial projects, large and small, around the world
 - Are the projects ready to proceed to the next phase?
 - Are the projects set up to succeed (or fail)
 - At the end, did the projects accomplish their goals?
- In a typical year, 600-700 new projects are added to our databases
- About 10 percent of these projects fall into the very large category—over \$1 billion in capital
- Projects in the \$5-\$10 billion range are now common and 5 projects over \$40 billion are headed for authorization




Industrial Megaprojects

- Megaprojects executed by the petroleum, minerals, chemicals, and power industries are now shaping the economic landscape around the world
- Easily accessed mineral resources close-to-market have largely been depleted
- Oil companies must venture into deep water and difficult environments because national resource holders control much of the easily-developed petroleum
- Chemical companies seeking low-cost feedstocks or fast-growing markets must exploit economies of scale to compete globally
- Extensive infrastructure development requires projects to be large enough to spread the infrastructure costs over a wide base of beneficial production to be economic

IPA Forecast of Industrial Megaproject Activity, 2000 - 2015



Geographical Distribution of Megaprojects Evaluated





The Key Issues

- Projects are getting larger and more complex everywhere in the world
- As we will see, large projects are failing much too often
- Do large projects fail more often simply because they are more difficult—or...
- Do we alter our practices?
- What do we need to do differently going forward?




Defining Success and Failure


 We deem a project to be a failure if one or more of the following occurred:

Costs grew (real)	25% +
Schedule Slipped	25% +
Overspent (Absolute Measure)	25% +
Severe and Continuing Operational Problems for 2 Years or more after startup	Yes

 About two-thirds of large projects failed by these criteria—twice the rate of smaller projects



Megaprojects Split Into Radically Different Groups





Seven Deadly Mistakes in Industrial Megaprojects

- I want to keep it all!
- 2. I want it yesterday!
- 3. We'll just work out the details of the deal later.
- 4. Why do you want to spend so much up-front?
- 5. Let's cut that cost estimate down!
- 6. Let contractors the risk; they're doing the project!
- 7. If the project manager overruns, fire the bastard!



I Want to Keep it All!

- Megaprojects affect many more people than just the investors
- All those affected by the project will want some say in how the project is organized and executed and especially in how the value of the project is allocated
- If these stakeholders—claimants on project value are not satisfied that the allocation is fair, they disrupt the project and render it unmanageable
- Disruption kills megaprojects because they are inherently fragile; when they break they tend to shatter




I Want it Yesterday! Speed Kills

- The drive for speed, results in the projects outrunning:
 - Basic technical data development
 - Stakeholder alignment
 - Permitting requirements
 - Front-end loading development
 - Even the business deal
- Large projects are complex and tightly interconnected
 - They cannot recover from cut-corners
 - There are no "work-around" strategies that actually work

Speed Kills

Dimensions of Failure

- High cost growth (25%+) Severe schedule slip (25%+)
- Large overspend (25%+) Production Failure (first two years)



The ABCs of Megaproject Failure

Antecedent

Aggressive

Schedule

Behaviors

Incomplete or Incorrect
Basic Data

Poorer Front-End Loading


Project Is Harder to Staff

Higher Project Leader Turnover

Team Is Not Integrated

Consequences

- +33% Cost Growth
- +37% Less Cost Effective
- +30% Schedule
- 48 Percent of Planned Production achieved 17 months after promised date



Mamas, don't let your babies grow up to be cowboys!

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Willie Nelson

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"We'll Work Out the Deal Later"

- The contours of the business deal, especially between resource holders and project sponsors, must be worked out before the project scope is developed
 - Exactly how are we going to generate a large enough revenue stream to repay the investment plus some profit?
 - How is the cost/tax regime of the resource going to be adjusted to fit the economic realities?
 - How will downside risks be allocated?
 - How will any upside be divided?
- The deal must shape the project; the project cannot shape the deal!




Why Do You Want to Load-up the Front-End?

- The front-end of projects—before we authorize them is the time for defining the scope and planning the execution in detail
- What is done (and not done) on the front-end has more bearing on megaproject outcomes than anything else
- But it's expensive—3 to 5 percent of eventual total cost—and people are often cheap in the name of being frugal
- Loading up the front-end is the best possible investment




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FEL is Most Important for Megaprojects




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FEL Drives Cost Predictability



Shading represents ±1 standard deviation


FEL Drives Schedule Predictability




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FEL Reduces Operability Problems

Failure to produce at or close to the rate promised at authorization is debilitating to the economics of the project!




Execution Planning Improves Safety



Project Execution Planning


Data are restricted to countries with strong reporting standards

How Well Are Megaprojects Defined at Authorization?



FEL Index

What Difference Does it Make?



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Let's Get that Estimate Down!

- A good many megaprojects die when the first full cost estimate is prepared....and that's a good thing!
- What is not good is when the business response to an estimate that is higher than the budget is "sharpen your pencils!
- Cost estimates are merely a reflection of the scope of the project that you want to do and the circumstances in which you must do the project
- Nearly 20 percent of the megaprojects in our database attempted a "cost-reduction exercise" just before or just after authorization
- Every last project failed.



The Contractors Should Carry the Risk!

- We often attempt to transfer cost risk to contractors in the form of lump-sum (fixed price) contracting; "we'll put a ceiling on the cost!"
- In megaprojects, risk transfer rarely actually occurs and even when it does, it is necessarily economically inefficient
- Contractors are non-capitalized, variable-cost firms
- They have very limited ability to carry large equitytype risks and price risk very aggressively when they are forced to carry it
- That is not gouging; it is plain common sense



Let's Hold the Wrong Folks Accountable!

- The very high failure rate in megaprojects is indeed the result of an accountability problem
- But those actually responsible for the failures are almost never those actually blamed
- Of the 207 failed industrial megaprojects that I reviewed, project management was actually culpable in less than 10 of the cases
- Overwhelmingly, the source of failure can be found in the within the business promoting the project
- The search for scapegoats should always start with the morning mirror



Stewen Keaydly illtistesken im bhdatstiad i Megaprojetsts

- 1. I want to allepateathe value fairly and stabilize the project
- 2. I want it yesterdaydule that will permit success, no faster
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Thank you!

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